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Introduction 
Introduction 
President Harry Truman was supposed to have said in desperation, "I 
am tired of all the economists who always say, 'On the one hand and, then 
again, on the other hand.' Send me a one-armed economist." Although 
Paul Samuelson once responded that a one-armed economist is a cripple, 
this report is an effort to supply serious answers, without much equivoca-
tion, to some of the key issues facing the American people. In the spirit of 
Harry Truman, it will have a minimum of hemming and hawing. It is not 
meant to be a textbook on how to be an economist, but rather a guide to a 
number of today's important economic questions. 
What are some of those key matters? As I travel around the country and 
speak to a wide variety of groups, some of the questions I am regularly 
asked are the following: 
• Can the U.S. government ever control the federal budget? Are those $200 
billion deficits inevitable? Why doesn't Congress cut all the waste and in-
efficiency out of the budget? 
• Can we do anything about military spending? If everyone knows about 
the waste in the Pentagon, why can't anyone stop it? 
• Are America's smokestack industries really going down the tube? 
• What are we going to do about foreign competition? How can we pos-
sibly compete against cooley wages and foreign government subsidies? 
• Why is the government trying to cut my Social Security? After all, I paid 
for it. 
• Who are all those special interests we hear so much about? 
• Why is American education going downhill, even though we are spending 
more for it? 
• Is "Reaganomics" working? And if it is, what does it mean for the fu-
ture of the economy? 
• Shouldn't our economy be more centrally planned? Don't we need a U.S. 
MITI in order to beat the Japanese at their own game? 
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vii 
• Isn't a large part of the problem with American business the stupid deci-
sions made by management? 
• Has the regulatory apparatus really changed much under the Reagan Ad-
ministration? 
• What can individual citizens do to protect themselves-or to change 
things? 
• And the inevitable question: if you are so smart, why aren't you rich? 
The following essays deal with diverse economic issues such as these-ex-
cept for the last! -with which I have been concerned over the years. I have 
tried to keep each essay short and to-the-point. The first section deals with 
several important issues that affect private enterprise in America today-
ranging from the record-high federal budget deficits, to current discussions 
of the need for a national ''industrial policy,'' to the demands made on 
businesses by corporate activists . 
The second section surveys problems in the world economy, particularly 
the resurgent sentiment for protectionism. It also contains an analysis of a 
new form of international regulation of business in which the United Na-
tions is involved. The third section contains essays on various aspects of 
government regulation, an economic issue that I have studied for a number 
of years. 
The final section of this report presents assessments of where we stand in 
a decade of important economic change, as well as a prognosis of where we 
are headed. The challenge we face in economic policymaking in the 1980s is 
a matter of making hard decisions and avoiding easy answers. On this 
score, I remain optimistic. I am impressed at how much nonsense we have 
unlearned-some of it very recently-and how many old and more modest, 
but harder, truths have been confirmed. 
Those truths often are in need of reaffirmation, since our concern with 
the free enterprise system in the United States is part of a larger national 
debate over fundamental values. It behooves us, in short, to relate econom-
ic issues-which often seem transient or limited in scope-to the broader 
interests of the public. We tend to lose sight of the fact that the close cor-
respondence between economic freedom and personal liberty is not acci-
dental. If we find it hard to be convinced of that fact, we need only spin 
the globe and take a good, hard look. 
Taken as a whole, these essays are intended to reflect a concern not only 
with our economic system, but also with our more basic desire to maintain 
and strengthen the free and voluntary society of which the economy is a 
vital but only constituent part. In fact, the shortest essay I could write 
would simply state that political freedom requires economic freedom. We 
foster one as we pursue the other. 
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I. Key Issues Facing Private Enterprise 
Beware of Megabaloney 
Anyone traveling around the country, especially the older industrial areas 
of the Midwest, increasingly encounters a feeling often approaching des-
pair. Clearly, there is genuine reason for concern about the future in re-
gions of high unemployment and declining sales. But I did not expect to 
find so many employed people and profitable companies joining in the talk 
of doom and gloom. So many of them now worry that manufacturing in-
dustries are all going down the tube, that only high-tech companies and 
knowledge workers will have a role in tomorrow's economy. What is the 
basis for this expectation? It turns out that there is currently a bull market 
for "big thinkers" who express their thoughts in dramatic absolutes. 
In widely circulated books and magazines, the big thinkers blithely tell us 
that the industrial era is over, that we are now living in an economy which 
is based only on the creation and distribution of information. On reflec-
tion, taking such overstatement at face value is just silly. Are we going to 
eat information, wear information, house ourselves in information? 
Of course, the so-called knowledge industries or research-intensive com-
panies are key growth sectors of the economy. But decades before we 
learned the buzzword ''high-tech,'' these were already the dynamic parts of 
our society. Just as surely, however, the production of goods will not 
wither away. After all, we will still need machines to produce and distribute 
knowledge and information. 
Moreover, major non-manufacturing industries (often called the "serv-
ice" sector) are important customers for the output of manufacturing cor-
porations. Utilities and airlines are obvious examples of capital-intensive, 
non-manufacturing operations. To the many executives in industrial firms 
who fear for their future, I urge them to discount the bloated vocabulary of 
the big thinkers who tell us that yesterday is over, that there are just two 
sectors of the economy (sunrise and sunset companies), and that we are be-
coming a microeconomic information self-help society, characterized by a 
galaxy of networking constellations. We must label such meaningless collec-
tions of buzzwords as Megabaloney! 
Of course, stripped of the rhetoric, there are serious problems facing in-
dustrial corporations-but they are solvable. However, these problems will 
not fade away by blaming ''unfair imports'' and by running to Washington 
for help. 
Many manufacturing companies have to deal with two related but incom-
patible trends-falling productivity and rising operating costs. When we 
compare, for example, U.S. and Japanese production experience, the re-
sults are very revealing. A study of the U.S. and Japanese automobile in-
dustries reveal that their absenteeism rate is 3 Y2 percent and ours is almost 
12 percent. Their labor turnover is 2 percent and ours is 15-20 percent. We 
cannot blame our poor labor practices on foreigners. It is no tribute to 
3 
either managerial leadership or worker conscientiousness when a large U.S. 
manufacturing company has to give a bonus each time an employee puts in 
a full work week! It is no surprise that this company is losing its share of 
world markets. 
The industrial heartland of our nation surely needs to be strengthened. 
But that does not mean propping up industries via import restrictions or 
government subsidies-or preventing them by law from closing down or 
''running away.'' Rather, labor and management in each company need to 
face the challenge of greater productivity and enchanced competitiveness. 
Management must show the way. Cutting back on the proliferation of staff 
activities and layers of executives creates an operating environment in which 
Discount the bloated vocabulary of big thinkers who 
tell us we are becoming a microeconomic information 
self-help society, characterized by a galaxy of 
networking constellations 
changes in needlessly costly workrules can be made and wage rates and 
fringe benefits brought back to reality. 
No, the sun is not going to set on U.S. manufacturing companies. In 
fact, it will rise on those that make the hard decisions that bring productivi-
ty up and costs down. And that's not megabaloney. 
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Fallacies of "Industrial Policy" 
As predictable as Spring crocuses, the high level of unemployment has 
led to pleas for an ''industrial policy'' to restore the health of the American 
economy. By guiding investment into growth areas and out of declining 
markets, a new federal industrial policy supposedly will restore the competi-
tiveness of American business at home and abroad. What is especially dis-
concerting about this development is the number of business executives who 
are joining in this chorus for more governmental intervention-these are 
men and women who normally champion private enterprise and oppose a 
bigger role for Uncle Sam in business decision making. 
One of the focal points for the advocates of industrial policy is the pro-
posed reestablishment of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC), a 
creature of the Depression of the 1930s that grew rapidly during and fol-
lowing World War II. Those with short memories may think well of that 
government enterprise, but a review of its activities is instructive for today's 
situation. Under the original act passed in 1932, Congress granted the RFC 
very modest lending powers limited to railroads and financial institutions. 
During the next six years, however, the agency's authority was steadily 
broadened. By 1938, it had the power to buy the securities of any business 
enterprise. Although it may have made a useful contribution during the De-
pression and World War II, the RFC made most of its loans to business in 
the postwar boom period of the late 1940s and early 1950s. 
By .1949, rumors circulated that connections with influential people in 
Washmgton were often the real criterion for gaining loan approvals from 
the RFC. Congressional hearings disclosed numerous examples of favorit-
ism in the granting of RFC loans. Finally, in 1953, Congress ended the life 
of this now discredited agency. The history of the RFC shows that govern-
ment subsidy of business encourages and perpetuates a misallocation of re-
sources. The agency's loans included such "high priority" ventures as dis-
tillers, brewers, drive-in theaters, hotels, motels, and bars. The RFC experi-
ence also demonstrates that government programs develop a life of their 
own and persist long after the problems for which they were created have 
been solved. 
Variations on the negative theme of focusing on the "losers" are not lim-
ited to the notion of bringing back the RFC. Some would attempt to stop 
economic change by dealing with the so-called "runaway plant problem." 
Their response is to make it extremely difficult and costly to move or close 
down an industrial facility. This "King Canute approach" ignores the rea-
sons why companies are forced to take such actions in the first place. So 
frequently, those plants have lost their competitiveness due in large part to 
the government policies advocated by the same groups that now support 
legislation preventing factory closings. Such proposals also overlook the 
negative signals that this policy would send out to any company considering 
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building a new plant in a region that has adopted restrictive legislation (and 
a few states have already done so). 
All this, however, need not lead to a "do nothing" approach to the seri-
ous economic questions that face the United States. There is a growth stra-
tegy that involves no expansion in either government power or federal 
spending. Its elements are basic-tax simplification, regulatory relief, lower 
deficit financing, and curtailed government lending. In each of these areas, 
much needs to and can be done. 
Although the 1981 tax reductions were surely welcome, the tax code is 
far more complicated today than it was just a few years ago. Simplification 
is especially important to the smaller firm. Similarly, the recent regulatory 
relief effort has accomplished much in reducing the burden of new rules. 
But fundamental improvement can come only from revising statutes that 
mandate unreasonable compliance burdens, such as the "zero discharge" 
goal of the Clean Water Act and the "zero risk" provision of the Delaney 
Amendment to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. 
It is ironic to contemplate the numerous industrial-policy proposals for 
funneling federal funds to "worthy" private investment areas at a time 
A growth strategy involves tax simplification, 
regulatory relief, lower deficit financing, and curtailed 
government lending 
when the federal government is running budget deficits of $200 billion a 
year. The most effective way to increase private capital formation is to re-
duce the federal drain on private saving represented by massive deficit fi-
nancing. 
Finally, federal lending programs are a classic example of robbing Peter 
to pay-or lend to-Paul. They do nothing to increase the pool of private 
saving, but reduce the amount available in the private market. The most ef-
fective strategy for encouraging economic growth is well known-reduce 
government barriers to competition and achieve a better functioning market 
economy. 
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Corporate Activists: Politicizing Business 
"Truth-in-labeling" is a concept with which every business executive has 
become well-acquainted. Yet it is ironic that many of the organizations and 
individuals that fought for the enactment of such statutes would flunk the 
most elementary truth-in-labeling test themselves. Take the example of the 
"corporate activists~' 
Judging by their self-designated title, you would expect that corporate ac-
tivists were engaged in the worthy enterprise of attempting to energize a 
sluggish company or were concerned with improving the economic perfor-
mance of American business. Nothing could be further from the truth. The 
typical ''corporate activists'' are oblivious to the economic role of private 
enterprise. Producing and distributing the goods and services that meet con-
sumers' needs is too humdrum a task to attract their interest. 
Rather, they see the resources of the private enterprise system as a means 
for achieving their social ends. One term they love to use is corporate or 
economic democracy. But, on the contrary, they refuse to abide by the de-
cisions of this nation's democratic political processes. They will buy a few 
shares of stock in a company-not as an investment-but to use the annual 
meeting as an opportunity to try to force the company to follow their pet 
social or political goals. These are goals which they are unable to convince 
Congress to adopt-such as an embargo of trade with specific nations or 
imposing our internal social standards on other countries. 
Thus, it is not surprising that, in recent years, shareholders in company 
after company have overwhelmingly voted down proposals such as one 
which would have required a company to invite a writer on solar energy to 
speak (at the annual meeting) on alternative energy sources. Imagine the 
waste of time and money involved in processing such a frivolous request-
or the presumptuous proposal to prohibit a cigarette producer from selling 
its products in a country where the government does not warn against 
smoking. Those "activist" shareholder resolutions cover a wide variety of 
issues: limiting or prohibiting business in South Africa, controls over con-
sumer marketing in the developing nations, and restraints on plant closings 
or relocation. 
Some of the activists' shareholder proposals involve great detail. One 
wo~ld req~ire a company to report on the environmental impact of a proj-
ect m Brazil. Another would have a bank stop lending to Guatemala. Still 
another would require a company to report on a plant closing in South 
Korea, providing an analysis of its employment practices. 
Not all the activists are on the left. Prohibiting trade with Communist 
nations is a perennial proposal by activists on the right. These proposals 
~ould require either ending trade links with Communist nations or adopt-
mg company policies to avoid buying or selling goods involving organiza-
tions engaged in "slave labor." 
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All these proposals share a common, fundamental defect: they ~ould 
politicize basic business actions. Buying and selling goods ~nd services 
would become political acts, to be debated at annual meetmgs by groups 
that have no interest in the firm's welfare. Each company would be forced 
"Corporate activists" see the resources of the private 
enterprise system as a means of achieving their social ends 
to adopt and pursue its own notions of what should be our foreign policy, 
environmental policy, and so forth. . . 
Fortunately, the great majority of indiv~dual shareholders and mstitu-
tional investors have more wisdom. They consider some of these matters as 
proper for government, but not for business decision makin~ .. The proper 
response to the various "activists" should ~ot ?e.the patromzmg one of 
saying, ''they are well-intentioned, but . . . . Wittmgly or no~, these efforts 
to politicize the business system would weaken the eco~omy s. perf~r~ance 
and reduce support for the private enterprise system. VIewed m this ~Ight, 
stockholder resolutions introduced by most activist groups are anythmg but 
well-intentioned and should be vigorously opposed! 
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How to Keep Income Tax Indexation 
Continuing deficits in the federal budget in the range of $200 billion an-
nually reflect our inability as a nation to make tough decisions and to 
choose among alternatives-each of which has strong attractions. The ada-
mant defense of retaining the scheduled indexing of the federal personal in-
come tax in 1985 is an important case in point. As a means of reducing 
"bracket creep" and eliminating the government's gain from inflation, in-
dexing of the tax structure is, of course, an inherently desirable type of tax 
reform. In fact, many of us used that argument in urging the Congress in 
1981 to enact the Economic Recovery Tax Act which, in its amended form, 
included this provision. 
Yet it is clear that tax reduction-and, despite all the obfuscation, tax 
collections will be lower with indexing-is part of the deficit problem. We 
have learned the hard way that, despite a great deal of wishful thinking to 
the contrary, cutting revenues does not automatically lead to reduced gov-
ernment spending. In fact, since the enactment of the 1981 tax law, the ex-
penditures of the federal government have continued rising faster than the 
economy. In real terms, the spending path is almost indistinguishable from 
the one traced out in President Carter's swansong budget message. 
We must reluctantly acknowledge the sad fact that across-the-board in-
come tax rate reductions do indeed increase deficits. Those of us who are 
committed to a smaller public sector must focus our efforts on the more 
obvious but difficult approach -directly reducing the flow of government 
spending. And, thus, we see that there is no substitute for getting Congress 
to appropriate less in the first place. 
It is discouraging to note how many of the proponents for retaining tax 
indexing pay only lip service to the need to slow down the rapid upward 
trend of government spending. They assure us that they are staunch advo-
cates of smaller budgets. But so many of them fall by the wayside when 
specific budget cuts are proposed, protesting that entitlements are too diffi-
cult to cut, defense spending is politically too important to cut, and the 
other categories are too small to mess with. 
In a very real sense, we have not earned the indexing of the federal in-
come tax structure. If we are to avoid losing that desirable reform of the 
tax system, we must begin another round of comprehensive budget cuts. 
We must not be distracted-as was the case last year-with proposals to 
increase Social Security taxes, excises, tariffs, etc. 
That highly necessary round of budget cuts should aim at achieving the 
traditional goal of federal budget practice: good budgeting is the uniform 
distribution of dissatisfaction. Alas, not enough federal departments and 
agencies-and their private-sector allies-have become dissatisfied by the 
budget cuts that have been made so far. The rationale for shifting from the 
5 percent annual real growth in military spending, which was a key point of 
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the 1980 Presidential campaign, to 10 percent remains unexplained. Surely, 
our military posture has not deteriorated in these last two years. 
Likewise, accelerating Social Security tax collections is no substitute for 
meeting head on the basic shortcoming of the federal government's "social 
insurance" programs: the benefit payments are far in excess of what an in-
surance program would be expected to provide-that is, benefits based on 
the payments by employees and their employers, including the earnings on 
those contributions. Although the term is upsetting to many, the hard fact 
is that the major portion of the average recipient's monthly Social Security 
check is the economic equivalent of welfare, a compulsory transfer of pur-
chasing power from somebody else to the recipient. 
Nor should the remainder of the federal budget escape tough scrutiny. A 
host of subsidies to special interests-sugar producers, dairy producers, 
ship builders, ship operators, exporters, and energy producers, to mention a 
few-remains in the federal budget. Each one of these items is an attractive 
candidate for elimination. 
However desirable as a tax reform, we should be careful not to claim too 
much for indexing of the tax structure. For example, some proponents 
claim that eliminating the indexing provision would produce a powerful in-
centive for Congress to force the Federal Reserve System to follow an infla-
tionary monetary policy. There is no need to guess what the response would 
be. In 1981-82, in the absence of an indexed tax system, the Fed did indeed 
pursue a deflationary monetary policy. The notion that the primary motiva-
tion of the Congress in the monetary policy area is to inflate the currency in 
order to reduce the deficit is just plain silly. It flies in the face of experi-
ence; if anything encourages excessive stimulation, it is the response to high 
unemployment. 
Similarly, the idea that repeal or postponement of indexing would imme-
diately lead to a rise in long-term interest rates and a weakening of there-
covery sounds quite divorced from reality. Passage of the indexing provi-
We need to cut spending first in order to justify the move 
to indexing at a time of massive deficit financing 
sion surely did not lead to a decline in long-term rates or to a strengthening 
of the economy's growth rate-nor did it cure baldness! If anything, finan-
cial markets will respond very positively to the prospect of lower deficits. 
Boiled down to its essentials, the case for postponing the indexing of the 
federal income tax system is one of avoiding instant gratification. We need 
to cut spending first in order to justify the move to indexing at a time of 
massive deficit financing. Such reductions in government outlays would 
make the retention of indexing more likely. Moreover, under such new cir-
cumstances, indexing would become an attractive way of developing pres-
sure to maintain a lower federal spending level well into the future. Yet, 
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surely we must lower spending first. The lessons of recent economic policy 
and practice are clear: lower taxes do not achieve lower government spend-
ing levels; rather, lower spending permits the responsible reduction of gov-
ernment tax schedules. 
11 
Dollars vs. Incentives in Education 
It has become fashionable to bemoan the inadequacy of federal spending 
on education. Some attention to this important area is surely warranted. 
When we probe beneath the surface, however, it becomes clear that the 
problem of educational quality in the United States is not primarily a ques-
tion of the amount of money devoted to this purpose but how we spend it. 
In 1974, the Federal Government disbursed $4.6 billion for aid to elemen-
tary, secondary, vocational, and higher education. In 1983, the budget esti-
mate for educational assistance is over $13.3 billion, almost three times as 
much as the amount spent at the beginning of the decade. During the same 
period, we have seen substantial deterioration in the measured performance 
of students. Clearly, simply spending more money on education is not suffi-
cient. This is not a justification, however, to spend less on our schools. 
Rather, experience underscores the need to improve the effectiveness with 
which the funds are used. 
My suggestion is to stress the role of incentives-incentives for both stu-
dents and teachers. For students, we need to provide incentives to perform. 
Blithely promoting students on the basis of their age and giving them (I use 
that verb advisedly) a high school diploma when they hit IS-regardless of 
their academic performance-provides no incentive to work hard. 
When I was in Florida recently, I observed the fierce discussions aroused 
by the State's new policy of issuing a high school diploma only when it is 
earned. I was particularly impressed by the statement of one high school 
principal that the students in his school moved from way below average 
performance on the statewide tests to substantially above average only after 
the school began to stress the need for performance. For many if not most 
of us, studying is hard work. Why do it if you get promoted and graduate 
whether you apply yourself or not? 
By the way, I read some of the questions in Florida's new statewide test-
ing program. That was quite an eye-opener. One question was roughly as 
follows. It showed two clocks, one at 1:50 and the other at 2:10. The stu-
dent was told that when Joe came in the room, the clock was in the first 
position, and when he left it was at the second position. The question was, 
"How long was Joe in the room?" To those who criticize such basic at-
tempts at performance testing, I must reply: How can we expect a young 
new worker to get to the job on time if he or she cannot even tell time? 
How can a person even get the job if he or she cannot fill out the applica-
tion form? The links between education and incentives and productivity are 
very strong. 
Likewise, incentives can play an important role at the teachers' level, too. 
That approach could help alleviate the shortage of math and science teach-
ers. In an economy with a rising need for people with mathematical and sci-
entific skills, how do we encourage more people to go into those fields? 
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The answer is not very complicated. We pay them more. 
But try doing that at the high school level. The reaction is predictable: 
howls of outrage. "Aren't gym teachers and social studies teachers as 
worthy as math and science teachers? Why should they be paid any less?'' I 
do not mean to be offensive, but frankly, that attitude betrays economic il-
literacy. Income is not a matter of inherent nobility. Indeed, it is a matter 
of attracting people to the areas of work in which they are needed. 
The links between education and incentives and 
productivity are very strong 
If colleges and universities paid science teachers and classics teachers the 
same, we would have a chronic shortage of physicists and a surplus of 
Latin professors. The prospect of higher pay is an important factor in en-
couraging more students to major in physics and math. Standard, across-
the-board pay increases for teachers may seem to make the administrator's 
job easier, but that only worsens the shortage situation. Far more impor-
tant, the old-fashioned approach to teachers' pay short-changes the student. 
The introduction of incentives will not be easy. The idea goes counter to 
the oldest bureaucratic argument for the status quo: "that's the way we 
have always done it." But given the realistic alternatives, greater use of in-
centives is an effective way of strengthening the educational process and 
improving the performance of our young people-not only in school but 
throughout their careers. 
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The Federal Budget Quandary 
Polar alternatives and dramatic extremes are always likely to attract pub-
lic attention. Discussions of the finances of the federal government are no 
exception. On the one hand, there are many economists and others who 
contend that budget deficits do not matter at all. They cite as evidence the 
current robust recovery in the face of an estimated $200 billion of federal 
borrowing. 
On the other hand, there is no shortage of financial and economic auth-
orities who point to the same deficit as the fundamental source of high in-
terest rates, the large foreign trade deficit, declining business investment, 
and other economic problems. 
Neither extreme is an accurate description of reality. The more likely out-
come-as is so frequently the case in economic disputations-is in that un-
attractive and dull middle position. When the government runs a deficit, 
that does make a difference. But surely deficits are not the only thing that 
matters. The underlying strength of the private sector is far more basic. In 
the short run, money supply changes swamp fiscal effects. Moreover, the 
impacts of government spending and deficit financing vary over time. 
In fact, time is the key. In the short run, a strong recovery in the econ-
omy is underway. According to my foggy crystal ball, this recovery will last 
at least until the polls close that Tuesday in November in George Orwell's 
year. 
But there are clouds on the e'conomic horizon. As citizens, we should be 
concerned about dealing with them right now. As business executives, we 
should crank that into our long-term planning. There are two major and 
overlapping clouds-the possibility that monetary policy will stay too easy 
too long, and the danger that fiscal or budget policy will continue to gener-
ate large deficits even as the economy continues to recover. 
In the monetary policy area, I hope that my standard analysis of the Fed-
eral Reserve Board's actions in the past is not appropriate once more: too 
much, too late. Combined with the budget deficits, we seem to be witness-
ing a version of conventional Keynesian stop-and-go policies, but without 
those pejorative labels. Personally, I believe that fiscal policy shortcomings 
constitute the basic culprit, and I will dwell upon them in a moment. 
Monetary policy, at least for 1981 and 1982, bore the responsibility for 
bringing down the inflation-and bringing down employment, too. Since 
then, monetary growth has been the major engine of recovery, but I hope 
that the Fed does not overdo the stimulus. 
The Initial Reagan Economic Program 
In order to understand our current budget problems, we must go back to 
the beginning-that is, to the beginning of 1981. On February 18, 1981, 
President Reagan, in a major economic address, presented to the nation his 
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program for economic recovery. A supporting White House document-
the so-called Economic White Paper-provided the detailed underpinnings 
of "Reaganomics." 
Specifically, the White Paper enunciated the four pillars of the program, 
as we came to refer to them: tax cuts, spending cuts, regulatory relief, and 
monetary restraint. Also included were the economic projections on which 
the budget numbers were based. This was the "Rosy Scenario," a term that 
I inadvertently coined. At an informal breakfast meeting with two Wash-
ington reporters at that time, I responded to their question about who 
would be the other two members of the CEA with a wisecrack: I deny that 
it will be an affirmative action hire known as Rosy Scenario. 
The published forecast was a compromise between my view of reality and 
that of the enthusiastic supply-siders who foresaw an instantaneous re-
sponse to the tax cuts in the form of an unparalleled burst of saving, invest-
ment, and work effort. The official forecast did show a slight upturn in un-
employment during an initial period of adjustment-but this was usually 
overlooked by private analysts. In any event, beginning in 1982, the White 
Paper projected an unusual pattern of rapid economic growth and declining 
inflation. 
Rosy-as we at times referred to the forecasts-did result in overestimat-
ing the government's revenues and underestimating expenditures. The up-
shot was that the White Paper showed much faster progress toward a bal-
anced budget than it was reasonable to expect-even on the basis of the ad-
ministration's policy proposals. 
But, in retrospect, more fundamental shortcomings are evident, and they 
dwell at the heart of the present budget quandary. That is, taxes were cut 
Fundamental shortcomings are at the heart of the present 
budget quandary. Taxes were cut more than envisioned 
and expenditures far, far less 
more than envisioned in the program for economic recovery and expendi-
tures far, far less. The initial budget statement of the new Administration 
had a line fpr "unspecified savings," presumably to be specified at a future 
date. That reminds me of the old song, "Tomorrow, I'll be leaving, but to-
morrow never comes." In a moment I will elaborate on this point. The re-
sultant large and rising budget deficits, however, put the entire onus for 
battling inflation on the Federal Reserve System. 
In light of the widespread expectations of rising budget deficits, perhaps 
it was not too surprising that the slowdown in the growth of the money 
supply in 1981 was greater than the Fed's own target-a target which the 
Administration repeatedly endorsed. I suggest, however, that the added 
monetary restraint contributed to a larger and deeper recession than was 
generally anticipated, and that, in turn, worsened the budget deficit. 
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Progress on the Reagan Budget 
Let us return to the budget quandary. The Administration's original tax 
proposal was to reduce the personal income tax by 10 percent a year for 
three consecutive years and to liberalize depreciation allowances. In an ef-
fort to decrease the deficit, the first installment of the proposed personal 
tax cut was reduced to 5 percent and postponed three months. But in the 
subsequent negotiations with the Congress on the tax bill, a ''bidding'' war 
occurred. 
The result was to see the addition of many expensive and extended provi-
sions added to the tax bill. These ranged from the temporary all-savers cer-
tificates to the permanent introduction of indexing. Other add-ons includ-
ing increasing the attractiveness of Individual Retirement Accounts andre-
ducing the marriage tax penalty. The financial markets interpreted all this 
as meaning an extended period of deficit financing. The resultant rise in in-
terest rates directly increased the budget deficit. To the extent that it exacer-
bated a weakness in capital-intensive sectors of the economy, the rise in 
rates also indirectly contributed to higher deficits in the budget. 
But what about all the spending cuts? One of the saddest but most re-
vealing analyses is a comparison of President Carter's budget plans with 
President Reagan's. On the surface, the growth in federal spending has 
been slowed down. But, on inspection, the slowdown was virtually entirely 
the result of lower inflation. Recasting the analysis in real terms is quite an 
eye-opener. When we compare the projections of spending for 1982-86 in 
President Carter's swansong budget with President Reagan's current num-
bers, we find that the differences are very small in real terms. In fact, it de-
pends on which price index or deflator you use as to whether you find the 
Carter or the Reagan real spending numbers to be lower. This finding may 
come as a surprise to those who read so much about all those budget cuts. 
But we must also take account of the continued rise in the "entitlements," 
in farm subsidies, and in military procurement. 
I do not criticize only the Congress or the Administration. There is plenty 
of blame to go around. After all, it was the President who submitted the 
$200 billion deficit budget-and it is the Congress that is going along with 
it. We truly are a democracy, with a small "d" of course. The people we 
elect do represent us. When you get down to basics, it is the average citizen 
who generates the pressure for more government spending. And please do 
not kid yourselves. You do not get off the hook by saying, "I'm all for 
economy in government, but ... don't cut the special project in my area or 
the one benefiting my industry, because that is different. That is an impor-
tant contributor to economic growth, etc.'' I still vividly recall my meeting 
with the representatives of an interest group pleading for a handout from 
the government. When I said, "That's the equivalent of welfare," they pro-
tested vehemently. Their unforgettable response was, "Welfare is for poor 
people:' 
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The Budget Outlook 
I am not saying that budget deficits are good for us. The American econ-
omy would be a lot healthier if the deficits were half their present size. But 
it seems clear that expansive monetary policy can, for a while, overcome 
much of the depressing effect of sustained deficit financing. But only for a 
while, and not completely. 
We are going to pay the price for those large deficits-
in terms of higher interest rates, larger balance of trade 
deficits, and lower economic growth 
We are going to pay the price for those deficits-in terms of higher inter-
est rates, larger balance of trade deficits, and lower economic growth than 
we otherwise would have. But that is different from forecasting economic 
doom and gloom. With an expanding economy and rising pool of saving, 
those deficits will, over time, shrink in importance in both absolute and rel-
ative terms. But to the extent that they force the Fed to maintain excessive 
stimulus, the deficits contribute to another round of inflation. Meanwhile, 
housing and business investment will increase more slowly than would oth-
erwise be the case. Thus, economic growth and the rise in living standards 
will be modest-unless we take the unlikely course of engaging in another 
round of comprehensive budget cuts. 
I have become truly nonpartisan on this matter. When the Republicans 
want to cut the social programs, I am with them. My service on the Budget 
Working Group convinced me that there are many further opportunities for 
economy in government-in every department and agency. 
Yet when the Democrats want to shave the rapid defense buildup, I am 
also with them. My studies of the defense industries convince me that pro-
duction bottlenecks may be likely in the years ahead, when rising business 
investment and expanding weapons production compete for the same lim-
ited resources. Unfortunately, the history of defense production tells us that 
crash programs usually crash -or they get cancelled. By the way, that is 
not poetry. In 1980 (the only year for which such data are available) most 
of the weapons programs with big cost overruns were cut back. Hardly any 
that stayed close to their targets suffered reductions in orders. 
There is also no reason to maintain, for the indefinite future, a policy 
that encourages members of the armed forces to retire in their early 40s and 
receive generous pensions while actually working in civilian employ-
ment-and then also qualifying for one or more additional pensions. So 
much for the notion that it is unpatriotic even to contemplate cutting the 
military budget. 
I part company with both sets of budget cutters, Republican and Demo-
crat-because they both want to apply the savings from their budget cuts 
to offset the cuts made by the other party. We need genuine reductions, not 
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just a reorientation of federal spending. Remember my favorite a?vic~ to 
Congressional committees, "Don't just stand there, undo somethmg. 
I have no panacea to offer-other than the strong belief that there are no 
panaceas. Beware of the easy answers. Salesmen notoriously have weak 
sales resistance, and it is sad to note that dynamic business leaders tend to 
demonstrate their sense of social responsiblity by uncritically accepting the 
popular buzzword of the day. If supply-side economics did not solve our 
ills neither will the adoption of an "industrial policy" nor a return to the 
goid standard. The budget quandary represents our unwillingness as ana-
tion to make hard choices-and the natural reluctance of our elected lead-
ers to keep our feet to the fire-and vice versa. If there is anything that I 
learned during my recent tour of duty in Washington, it is that Pogo was 
right. "We has met the enemy, and they is us." 
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The Defense Buildup: Is It Feasible? 
The second largest category of outlays in the U.S Budget, after the so-
called "entitlement" outlays, is national defense. Here we should acknowl-
edge at the outset that there is a broad-based agreement on the need to ex-
pand U.S. national defense spending. Both the Carter and Reagan budgets 
projected significant growth in defense spending, in real terms, for each of 
the five fiscal years 1982-1986. As the Council of Economic Advisers stated 
in its annual report accompanying the President's Economic Report of Feb-
ruary 10, 1982, "any economic effects ... must be assessed in the context of 
the overriding need for maintaining the level of defense spending necessary 
for national security.'' 
Official projections of future defense outlays, after adjustment for infla-
tion, have risen successively during the last two years from 5 percent to 10 
percent per annum. I find little justification offered of the economic feasi-
bility or of the military necessity of this sharply upward movement. A 
tough-minded attitude should be taken to the military budget, comparable 
to the treatment of many civilian spending activities of the federal govern-
ment. Because of the potential capacity problems, a given cutback in nomi-
nal military spending would actually result in less than a proportional re-
duction in real procurement outlays. This would come about because of re-
duced price pressures on military purchasing generally. 
As would be expected, there has been considerable disagreement over the 
specifics of the buildup, including how rapid an expansion in military 
spending is desirable. But none of this is a debate between hawks and 
doves. Among the specific questions raised is the economic feasibility of the 
currently contemplated schedule of military outlays. Moreover, the 1981-82 
recession has resulted in such s·ubstantial amounts of excess capacity in 
American industry that, at least for the next year or two, there is likely to 
be adequate capacity to meet military and civilian needs. But it is useful to 
look beyond, to the middle of the decade, when significant economic 
growth may coincide with the peak of the military buildup. In such circum-
stances, capacity questions would arise and three results of the defense 
buildup can be anticipated: 
1. The substantial transfer of resources in the durable goods sector to de-
fense production may increase prices in key industries. Both the De-
partment of Defense and private purchasers would have to pay more 
for goods purchased from these industries. This premium is likely to 
increase with the size of the defense budget. 
2. Increased demand may produce delays in the delivery of military 
goods. Delivery timetables that seem realistic today may become obso-
lete as producers try to accommodate both the defense buildup and 
the expansion in civilian investment. 
3. Some crowding out of private investment may occur. Defense procure-
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ment uses many of the same physical resources needed for private in-
vestment and the law gives defense priority in the marketplace. Some 
private flrms may turn to foreign sources, while others may cancel or 
postpone plans for expansion. 
When we examine the details of the military budget, we find that the 
concentration of the planned military increases within the categories of pro-
curement and research and development implies weapon production g.rowth 
rates even more rapid than those which occurred at the peak of the VIet-
nam buildup. Moreover, the present expansion occurs after a decade of 
steady reductions in the defense industrial base. 
A private economic consulting organization, Data Resources, Inc. (DRI), 
points out that ''the combination of the increasing. defens.e shares ~~~ the 
acceleration in growth rates raises concerns about mdustnal capabilities and 
A tough-minded attitude should be taken to 
the military budget, comparable to that of many 
civilian spending activities 
spillover impacts on the economy.'' DRI goes on to note that, with the im-
plementation of significant investment programs in both plant and equip-
ment and skilled labor forces, the problems of price pressures, bottlenecks, 
and crowding out of civilian demand ''could be constrained to isolated in-
stances." Over the six-year period 1982-87, double-digit increases in annual 
output are shown for many industries, ranging from semiconductors to .. 
computers. I share the DRI conclusion that uncertainties about the capabth-
i.ies of the defense industrial base, and its linkages to other critical econom-
ic variables will continue to cloud decisions regarding the defense budget. 
Since 1948, there has never before been a period of sustained growth in 
real defense spending such as that now planned. The projected require-
ments for such large increases in defense output raise obvious questions 
about the ability of industry to meet them without adverse implications in 
terms of costs and lead times. A recent study by the U.S. Department of 
Commerce reminds us that defense expenditures do not affect all industries 
equally, but have "highly concentrated industrial impacts." 
For most of the 58 major defense supplying industries Commerce 
studied, the Department reported that existing capacity and planned in-
creases are sufficient to supply the projected military and civilian demands 
through 1985. However, the Department said that, should further capacity 
expansion not take place in some of these industries, meeting projected 
1985 requirements would mean using outmoded, economically inefficient 
capacity, which would increase costs and prices. In any event, there are ~ 
few potential bottleneck areas. For example, requirements for lead smeltmg 
and refining are projected to rise by 12 percent from 1979 to 1985, but eco-
nomically efficient capacity is estimated to decline by 4 percent. Likewise, 
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requirements for brass, bronze, and copper foundries are shown to increase 
by 32 percent, but economically efficient capacity is expected to rise by 25 
percent. How will all this balance out? 
Some of our basic metal processing industries will likely increase their de-
pendence on foreign sources of supply in order to meet the stepped-up mili-
tary demands. For example, the electrometallurgical products industry 
(which was specifically noted by the Commerce Department because of its 
"qualitative importance to defense") met 27 percent of its needs with im-
ports in 1979. That key industry is expected to increase its dependency to 45 
percent in 1985. Likewise, zinc smelting and refining is anticipated to in-
crease its import dependency from 33 percent in 1979 to 45 percent in 1985. 
Imports of miscellaneous, refined nonferrous metals are estimated to com-
prise 66 percent of the industry in 1985, compared to 56 percent in 1979. It 
is ironic to note the matter-of-fact way in which the Commerce Department 
reports such increased foreign dependence for some of the key defense-pro-
ducing industries. On many other occasions, the hoary national security ar-
gument is trotted out to justify a host of subsidies to sectors of the econ-
omy far less closely related to defense output. 
An important implicit assumption arises from these concerns: any adjust-
ment of scheduled defense outlays to conform more closely with expected 
domestic production capabilities would result in slowing down the rate of 
increase in defense spending in the next few years and, thus, lower the pro-
jected budget deficits. 
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II. The Global Economy 
A Positive Approach to Trade 
As a nation, we love to pay lip service to the advantages of free trade. 
Nevertheless, the United States seems to be moving back toward protection-
ism. Public policy debates are now dominated by one-sided, self-serving 
views of international trade. Everyone wants open markets and free trade 
overseas; we all know how urgent it is to eliminate "their" barriers to our 
exports. But United States barriers to their exports do not generate much 
interest over here. 
Let me explain this with a very basic example-Country A and Country 
B. Country A is on one side of the ocean, and Country B is on the other. 
Country B has a large export surplus with Country A, and Country A expe-
riences great difficulty getting its exports into Country B. Sounds familiar? 
Of course, Country B is Japan (big trade surplus) and Country A is the 
United States (big trade deficit). 
But that is not the end of the story. When we take another look, we find 
that Country B (big trade surplus) is the U.S. and Country A (big trade 
deficit), Western Europe. Over the last decade, we have had a large trade 
surplus with the European community, almost as large as our deficits with 
Japan. And we have erected an array of obstacles to imports into the Uni-
ted States. Although many Americans are agitated over our trade deficits 
with Japan, how many are even aware of our large trade surpluses with 
Western Europe? It is not surprising that, given this difference in aware-
ness, protectionist pressures are on the rise. 
U.S. Barriers to Imports 
It would help to clear the air in international trade discussions if the Uni-
ted States were to acknowledge that all of our actions are not on the side of 
the angels. We have created many obstacles to inhibit imports into the Uni-
ted States. 
"Buy American" statutes give preference to domestic producers in gov-
ernment procurement. As much as a 50 percent premium is paid for domes-
tic production of military goods. In addition, American materials and prod-
ucts must be used for purchases over $500,000 under the program of aid to 
mass transit. Also, American flag vessels must be used to ship at least 50 
percent of the gross tonnage of all commodities financed with U.S. foreign 
aid funds. 
The Buy American laws of the states are varied. New York requires state 
agencies to buy American steel. New Jersey requires that all state cars must 
be domestically produced. In addition, numerous states and municipal 
authorities require utilities, whether they are privately owned or publicly 
owned, to use American materials. 
The Jones Act prohibits foreign ships from engaging in commerce be-
tween American ports. This law, of course, effectively bars all competition 
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in U.S. domestic marine transport. The perverse effects of such laws are 
greater than might be expected. For example, at times Canadian lumber 
transported by Japanese flag vessels has undersold domestic timber from 
Oregon in the lucrative Southern California markets. In such cases, both 
the American merchant marine and the American timber industry suffer 
damage. Foreigners then become the unintended beneficiaries of these 
backfiring attempts to subsidize the American merchant marine. 
Many of our statutes limit imports of agricultural products such as sugar, 
beef, dairy produce, and even mandarin oranges. Under the Meat Import 
Act, the President has authority to impose beef import quotas if imports of 
beef reach a certain trigger level. In practice, the U.S. generally has encour-
aged foreign exporters to restrain their sales voluntarily to avoid the imposi-
tion of formal quotas. 
Our average tariff rates are low-scholarship requires me to state that 
they are as low as Japan's! Yet, the United States does levy high tariffs on 
selective items. Tariffs on textiles average 20 percent. Duties on fruit juices 
are over 27 percent, and the rate on ceramic products is over 14 percent. In 
It is not a question of merely accepting the existing array 
of protection. The challenge is to deal with rising pressures 
for further restriction of world trade 
addition, numerous nontariff barriers, often of a regulatory nature, are im-
posed by federal, state, county, and municipal governments. 
Despite this nation's overall free trade posture, "protection" against im-
ports into the United States now covers such basic industries as automo-
biles, steel and textiles. Pleas for further trade restrictions extend to such 
esoteric sectors as mushrooms, ceramic tableware, and even mechanics' 
shop towels. It is not a question of merely accepting the existing array of 
protection. The challenge is to deal with the rising pressures for further re-
striction of world trade. 
The Pressures for Protectionism 
The first step is to understand why protectionism is popular. It is a 
means by which small, well-organized groups use the political process to 
their advantage. The benefits are received by the protected industries, while 
some costs are shifted to other companies that buy from the protected in-
dustries. Ultimately, most of the costs are borne by consumers in the form 
of higher prices. Thus, protectionism can be viewed as a hidden tax on the 
consumer. Like so many sales taxes, it is unfair. For example, a report 
from the Center for the Study of American Business showed that "volun-
tary'' quotas on imports of footwear served as a regressive tax whereby 
low-income consumers were harder hit than high-income consumers. The 
Reagan Administration has eliminated these footwear quotas. 
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Protectionist measures are a two-edged sword. They may reduce imports 
from abroad-and the United States was "successful" in getting the Com-
mon Market to restrict its exports of steel to us. But our domestic automo-
bile industry, a major purchaser of steel, bears the burden of higher costs, 
which in turn will make it less competitive. All this generates pressures for 
more protection-witness the domestic content bill recently proposed to 
protect auto industry employment. In addition, lower imports mean fewer 
dollars abroad to buy American exports. 
Positive Approaches to Trade Policy 
Let me outline five positive approaches to these problems. First and most 
fundamental is carrying out domestic economic policies that expand pro-
duction and incomes while holding down inflation. This, of course, is a 
plug for tax simplification, spending reduction, and regulatory relief. A 
healthy economy nips the protectionist sentiment in the bud. 
Second is maintaining greater balance in macroeconomic policies. Our 
shift in 1981 to tight monetary policy and expansive fiscal policy contribu-
ted substantially to high interest rates and a rise in the value of the dollar. 
Smaller budget deficits will also help us to achieve smaller trade deficits. 
Meanwhile, if we are not careful, we will see an easy money policy-coupled 
with outsized budget deficits-lead to another inflationary spiral, which 
would further reduce the competitiveness of U.S. products in world markets. 
Third is limiting any government "trade adjustment assistance" -which 
seems to be a politically necessary part of any comprehensive trade policy-
to temporary aid in shifting labor and capital from industries hard hit by 
imports to more competitive activities. All too often, the government aid 
merely maintains an inefficient and uncompetitive industrial structure. 
That, in turn, adversely affects our competitiveness in world markets and 
generates further pressure for additional protectionist measures. The result 
is lower domestic employment, which, in turn, generates additional pres-
sures for government interference. That is an example of a more general 
principle: government intervention begets more government intervention. 
In a healthy and dynamic economy we must expect that some industries 
and regions will grow more rapidly than others and that some sectors will 
experience difficulty in maintaining their position and may even decline. 
We must rely primarily on market forces, and not on government bailouts, 
to make the appropriate adjustments. We only fool ourselves if we think 
that the solution to the real problems facing American industry is more 
government intervention -and that federal aid does not come with strings 
attached. Any business executive who still believes that government is his 
friend is too naive to be let out alone at night. 
Fourth is acknowledging the positive role of multinational corporations 
in the world economy. Multinationals adapt to change more readily and are 
less likely to plead for protection than other companies. They also are the 
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private-sector alternative to foreign aid and other types of ~overnment i?-
tervention. This, of course, explains why so-called transnatiOnal enterpnses 
We only fool ourselves if we think that the solution to 
the real problems facing American industry is more 
government intervention 
are not universally popular and are being attacked in international organi-
zations. 
Fifth is focusing on improving our own productivity. We cannot blame 
our poor production practices on foreigners. The answer is not to prop up 
industries via import restrictions or government subsidies-or to prevent 
them by law from closing down or ''running away.'' Rather, labor and 
management in each company need to face the challenge of greater produc-. 
tivity and enhanced competitiveness. 
The current economic problems that face the U.S. and many other coun-
tries will not be solved by responding to the parochial concerns of individu-
al industries and regions. Nor should international economic relations be . 
dominated by short-term protectionist pressures from the producers o~ edi-
ble seaweeds, casein, and manhole covers-to name some recent candidates 
for protection. We will truly strengthen our foreign trade posture only as 
we improve our domestic productivity and competitiveness. 
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The Benefits of Free Trade 
Some broader perspective on the current debate about free trade versus 
protectionism is useful. The case for free trade is rooted in a basic econom-
ic law: the principle of comparative advantage, which holds that total eco-
nomic welfare will be enhanced if each nation specializes in the production 
of items that it can produce, in relative terms, most efficiently. This, of 
course, is an important case of Adam Smith's more general point concern-
ing the advantages of the specialization of labor. 
Historical Experience 
The arguments in favor of free trade are supported by a great deal of his-
torical evidence. Through most of the twentieth century, the United States 
has played a strong leadership role in developing the world trading system. 
During the 1930s, however, the United States and many other countries fol-
lowed "beggar-thy-neighbor" trade policies which contributed substantially 
to the worldwide depression. Unfortunately, as a people we have short in-
stitutional memories. Why, many of our students seem to think that 
Smoot-Hawley is a British rock group! But let us recall that it was the 
Smoot-Hawley protectionist tariff that epitomized the beggar-thy-neighbor 
approach in the United States. The results for many companies were ex-
tremely negative. Firms that had relied on substantial foreign business were 
limited to the domestic market, which for some was inadequate for surviv-
al. In any event, retaliation was counterproductive, a negative-sum game 
that harmed consumers in the United States and in other nations. 
After World War II, this country embarked on a program of reciprocal 
trade agreements. Initially arranged bilaterally, they evolved into the effec-
tive multilateral trading system of the postwar years. This approach broke 
down many of the historical barriers to world trade. An especially fine ex-
ample occurred in the 1960s: the acceleration in world trade and economic 
growth in that decade followed a sharp and mutual reduction in tariff bar-
riers which contributed to lower prices for consumers. We continue today 
to reap benefits from the policies initiated in those years. 
We can turn to our own economic history for earlier examples of the 
benefits of an open economy. This country began as a trading nation. If 
the concept of "Gross National Product" had existed in the 18th and 19th 
centuries, people would have pointed to the United States as one of the 
more open economies in the world, as measured by the share of GNP in-
volved in foreign trade. I say that even though tariff debates were common 
throughout the 19th century. In its early years, the United States was 
among the more trade-oriented economies in the world. We were major 
suppliers of a wide variety of agricultural exports and raw materials, and of 
such delicacies as rum. In addition, our service exports, such as shipping, 
were an important economic activity. We were a major importer of manu-
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factured goods and a major recipient of foreign capital. These factors con-
tinued to play a critical role in the development of the American economy 
during the 19th century. 
Around the turn of the century the dynamics of the American economy 
shifted. Exports and imports became smaller shares of GNP and remained 
rather stable. U.S. investment abroad increased, gradually transforming us 
from an international debtor into a world creditor. Increasingly, we became 
a self-sufficient economy. Only in the last 20 years has the international 
sector once again begun to increase its relative importance in our economy. 
Foreign trade is now an important element in U.S. business and employ-
ment. Exports and imports of goods and services each now represent over 
12 percent of our Gross National Product. Twenty years ago, exports were 
less than 6 percent of GNP; imports, less than 5 percent. Much of this shift 
has occurred in the past decade, when imports and exports as a share of 
GNP doubled and a positive export balance has been maintained. Despite 
all the concern about a U.S. merchandise trade deficit, it is clear that this 
country generally runs a surplus when we consider both goods and services. 
In an economy that increasingly has been shifting toward a service orienta-
tion, any analysis of international economic activity that ignores the impor-
tant service sector surely is inadequate. The growing exports of services has 
contributed to a net trade surplus for most of the last decade. 
We should note that there is a close, but not generally appreciated, con-
nection between imports and exports. A strong trade position requires both 
a high volume of imports and a high volume of exports. In fact, the only 
way, in the long run, to increase a country's exports is to increase its im-
ports. U.S. exporters need to find foreign buyers with the dollars necessary 
to buy their goods and services. In general, these dollars are obtained when 
Americans import and pay for foreign goods and services. 
In the short run, it is true that we can and do lend foreigners the dollars 
with which to buy our exports. When such loans are made at market rates 
of interest, trade is properly advanced. But when government-subsidized 
credit is provided, such funds are denied to other, more productive uses in 
the domestic economy. 
Imports put dollars ·in the hands of foreigners-dollars which can then 
be used to buy our exports. It follows that restrictions in imports will result 
in fewer dollars in the hands of those in other countries that might want to 
buy our wheat, aircraft, chemicals, or machinery-unless, of course, we 
make up the difference through loans or transfer payments to foreigners. 
In some cases, the connection between imports and exports is even more 
direct. Import restraints can reduce employment and profits in our more 
productive export industries, in many cases in the same region of the coun-
try. For example, in the non-rubber footwear industry, U.S. exports of 
hides to foreign shoe producers suffered as a result of our restraints on the 
import of foreign shoes. 
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The Advantages of Free Trade 
Let us generalize from historical experience. The benefits of free trade 
are numerous: 
1. Open trade contributes to lower prices by increasing the supply of 
goods and services competing for the consumer's dollar. Thus, the 
question of free trade is basically a consumer issue, and an extremely 
important one. 
2. Open trade minimizes the role of government in influencing private-
sector decisions. This allows individuals and business firms to respond 
to the needs and pressures of the international marketplace. Viewed in 
this light, free trade is key to promoting economic freedom and the 
private enterprise system. 
3. Open trade improves the efficiency with which our own resources are 
allocated. Thus, we can see that free trade yields more growth, higher 
levels of employment, and an improved living standard here at home. 
Aside from the direct and measurable aspects, trade stimulates competi-
tion, stirs creative activity, rewards individual initiative, and increases na-
tional productivity. Among nations, it speeds the exchange of new ideas 
The question of free trade is basically a consumer 
issue, and an extremely important one 
and advanced technology. In the long run, international trade means the 
creation of new jobs and the reduction of inflation. In sum, free trade con-
tributes to a healthier economy-one with more job opportunities and a 
wider variety of goods and services for consumers. 
The Costs and Benefits of Protectionism 
In this time of great interest in benefit/cost analysis, we may inquire as 
to what are the costs of free trade as well as the benefits. The obvious costs 
are those borne by the workers who become unemployed as a result of im-
ports-assuming that imports are the cause. What is less apparent, howev-
er, is that any form of trade restraint to help a specific industry affected by 
imports really is an internal transfer of income and wealth to that industry 
from U.S. consumers. That transfer takes income and wealth away from 
American workers and owners of our export industries, who bear the brunt 
of retaliatory trade restrictions in the form of fewer jobs and lower profits. 
Moreover, many of the benefits of protectionist measures, even to the 
group advocating them, turn out to be very temporary. For example, 
quotas on shoe imports resulted in an upgrading in the quality of imports. 
Thus, American producers found themselves threatened in that part of the 
market in which, prior to the protectionist action, they firmly dominated. 
The same process is taking place in the current case of ''voluntary'' re-
straints of Japanese auto imports. 
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One of the great difficulties in public policy discussions involving protec-
tionist measures is the fact that the beneficiaries are usually few in number. 
Yet each has a large individual stake in the outcome. Moreover, those who 
benefit from protectionism have little concern about the likelihood of retali-
ation by foreign governments on other American industries. Thus, the in-
centive is strong for vigorous and concentrated political activity designed to 
erect special-interest trade barriers. 
In addition, pleas for protectionism reflect the ability of relatively small 
but influential groups to convince legislatures to adopt policies that benefit 
them, albeit at the expense of citizens at large. The balance of power is ex-
tremely uneven, given the limited knowledge that consumers currently have 
about these matters. Those who benefit from exports and from the greater 
supply of goods and services are generally not even aware of the process by 
which they benefit. Although the benefits of open trade may far exceed the 
costs, those benefits-such as lower prices to consumers-are widely dif-
fused among 50 states and 233 million residents. Any single consumer's 
stake in the outcome is quite small. The individual consumer almost surely 
is not aware why the price of a given item is going down-or not rising. 
Consequently, resistance at the grass roots level to protectionist measures so 
often is considerably less than pressures for their adoption. 
Nevertheless, if an economy is to reap the benefits of free international 
trade, it also must incur the costs. After all, trade changes the prices of in-
dividual commodities and, thus, forces reallocation of resources. Trade is 
truly a dynamic process. Over time, a nation engaged in trade experiences 
further changes in costs, technology, and tastes-all of which, in turn, alter 
the composition of its exports, imports, and domestic production. The ad-
justments do not occur instantaneously. And we must acknowledge that the 
benefits are not distributed evenly throughout the economy. Nevertheless, 
the consumer savings from freer trade exceed any sensible adjustment pro-
grams instituted for those who are initially hurt by the change. 
Scholarly studies typically show that the total benefits of freer trade far 
exceed the costs. These gains from trade include savings to consumers, 
gains from moving resources out of inefficient sectors, stimulus to invest-
ment, and increased economies of scale. 
Given the economic realities of the 1980s, international competition has 
become the most effective spur to greater domestic productivity. That pain-
ful but effective enhancement of the competitiveness of American enter-
prise is now the most important benefit from free trade. 
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Self-Inflicted Wounds to American Exports 
The American public knows that many countries make it difficult for 
United States companies to export the goods and services that they pro-
duce. However, what is rarely appreciated is the fact that the United States 
government also places numerous obstacles in the way of our exports. 
Many domestic U.S. policy actions reduce the ability of American firms to 
compete both at home and abroad. Two prominent categories are U.S. reg-
ulations which impose burdens on domestic production not borne by for-
eign producers, and export controls, which restrict various types of exports 
on national security or foreign policy grounds or for domestic political 
reasons. 
These obstacles to our own exports are self-inflicted wounds. Frankly, 
they tend to make us a laughing stock overseas when we urge other coun-
tries to lower their barriers to our exports while we make it more difficult 
for our exporters. 
Domestic Regulatory Barriers to Exports 
The United States conducts a great variety of domestic regulatory activi-
ties which inevitably increase the prices of U.S. goods and services. In some 
cases, foreign producers are not subject to similar burdens. In many other 
instances, the social objectives of other nations are achieved at lower cost. 
There are important, special burdens that the federal government has im-
posed on companies involved in foreign trade. For example, the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 requires strict record-keeping standards to 
monitor the anti-bribery sections of the statute. Violators of the Act face 
severe penalties. A company may be fined up to $1 million, while its offic-
ers who directly participate in violations or have reason to know of them 
face up to five years in prison and $10,000 in fines. Unfortunately, it is dif-
ficult to raise any discussion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act without 
being criticized for being callous on ethical matters. However, this statute 
has been cited for establishing a regulatory regime that displays the same 
cavalier attitude toward the burdens it imposes as do many other well-inten-
tioned regulations. A former chairman of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, the agency administering the Act, has stated, "the anxieties 
created by the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act-among men and women of 
utmost good faith-have been, in my experience, without equal." 
One of the major criticisms of the Act is that it has cost the American 
firms export opportunities without reducing the level of foreign corruption. 
By precluding American firms from taking part in questionable transac-
tions, which may be perfectly legal and acceptable practices in many other 
nations, the Act reduces the ability of U.S. firms to compete overseas. The 
General Accounting Office has found in a survey of 250 American compan-
ies that 30 percent of the respondents that engaged in foreign business had 
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lost business as a result of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. The GAO 
has recommended that Congress amend the law to clarify several important 
provisions. 
In addition to these highly publicized activities, several environmental 
programs impose requirements with regard to exports. For example, the 
regulations under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act 
require exporters to notify countries for which products are destined that a 
hazardous product is being exported 30 days in advance of the export-
even if the product is not viewed as hazardous under the laws of the im-
porting country. The importing nation must notify the exporter that the 
notice was received. No other country has such a restriction. 
Export Controls 
In many ways-and often without considering the effects-we have 
enacted laws and promulgated regulations that prohibit U.S. exports or 
make it more difficult for American companies to compete in foreign 
markets. For example, the Trans-Alaskan Pipeline Authorization Act 
prohibits the export of oil from North Slope fields. A provision added to 
an appropriations act for the Interior Department bans timber exports 
from federal lands west of the 100th meridian. When laws get that 
specific, you can detect the smell of special interest pressures. 
In addition, the Export Administration Act provides for controls on 
exports of goods and technology to protect national security. That 
sounds fine. But, in practice, the law mandates controls over a great 
variety of products, including domestically produced crude oil, refined 
We have enacted laws and promulgated regulations that 
make it more difficult for American companies to 
compete in foreign markets 
petroleum products, unprocessed red cedar and, my favorite, horses ex-
ported by sea. In 1980 the Act was employed to embargo grain exports 
to the Soviet Union for national security reasons. It was invoked again in 
1982 to carry out the ban against U.S. firms participating in the con-
struction of the natural gas pipeline between the U.S.S.R. and Western 
Europe. 
Export controls do more than limit U.S. international trade for the 
time they are imposed. These restrictions call into question the reliability 
of the United States as a supplier of products to other countries, which 
are likely to develop alternative sources. A clear example is soybeans-
hardly a product that could be considered a strategic item. Although the 
purpose was to contain a short-term increase in domestic prices, the main 
effect of the U.S. embargo of soybean exports in 1974 was to induce 
Japan to turn to other producing countries, particularly Brazil. Japan 
34 
proceeded to invest huge amounts in that country to develop alternatives 
to U.S. production, thus effectively and permanently reducing our share 
of the world soybean market. 
Conclusion 
Most export restrictions have been ineffective in meeting the foreign 
policy objectives that motivated them. Why do we keep them? Because 
they seem to be an inexpensive way of showing the public that the 
government is "doing something." Keeping down U.S. exports may not 
show up in the budget of the State Department, but such action surely 
weakens the American economy. 
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Is the United Nations A Global Nanny? 
International organizations such as the United Nations are expanding 
their efforts to regulate business. As an important example, take the 
U.N.'s draft Guidelines for Consumer Protection. 
How could anyone possibly oppose guidelines designed to protect the 
consumer? It takes a hard heart to question the pr'oposed United Na-
tions' promulgation of such good things as product safety and purity, 
consumer education, and international cooperation. Yet, when you push 
aside the verbiage, you quickly find that the Draft Guidelines for Con-
sumer Protection would flunk a truth-in-labeling test. Indeed, the so-
called Guidelines have the makings of a blueprint for a more centrally 
directed society than now exists in any of the market-oriented economies 
in the world. 
The Draft Guidelines for Consumer Protection contain seven objec-
tives. Here is one sweeping goal: 
To curb business practices at the national and international 
levels which adversely affect consumers (including abuses of a 
dominant position of market power by private and public 
enterprises). 
Surely we all deplore business abuses, but how do we define business prac-
tices that "adversely affect consumers"? And who defines them? Nearly 
any product or business practice may be arbitrarily labeled "abusive" when 
it is held up against a standard that cannot be achieved or which consumers 
do not wish to pay for. 
Other objectives in the Guidelines are equally troubling when we consider 
their far-reaching nature. Here is an example: 
To promote just, equitable and sustainable economic and social 
development. 
This is an imposing, high-minded ideal. But who is going to define what is 
"just" and "equitable" in any specific instance? Also, who is going to de-
cide-and then control-what is "sustainable" development? And here is 
another "objective": 
To establish standards of ethical conduct for those engaged in 
production and distribution of goods and services to consumers. 
Certainly, ethical conduct is laudatory. But who will set the standards of 
"ethical conduct"? Who will place themselves above all others and regulate 
private behavior? How substantially would the interpretation of ethical 
conduct by a totalitarian differ from that of a free society? 
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The draft Guidelines also contain a set of general principles that govern-
ments are called upon to follow "to develop or strengthen their consumer 
protection policies. '' These principles are written as high-minded notions of 
"rights." The list is impressive and includes "physical safety from danger-
ous goods and services, " "economic safety from offences or malpractices 
[that deny benefits to consumers]," consumer information and education, 
and the right to form consumer groups and have their views represented in 
"the decision-making process. " 
At first blush, most of these principles or "rights" sound admirable. But 
even if a consensus could be reached on them, they do not materialize out 
of thin air. In each case, they imply a substantial expansion of the role of 
government. 
Furthermore, nowhere do the Guidelines stipulate that there are costs at-
tached to the array of benefits. For example, the achievement of greater 
physical safety involves added costs in producing or distributing a product. 
The United States has learned the lesson that government-mandated 
safety standards raise the price of products-and, as a result, "price out" 
some of the most vulnerable consumers (e.g., those with low incomes) from 
the market for those products. Ironically, such "pricing out" leads to 
greater consumer risk. For example, requiring a safer but more expensive 
ladder than those now in common use would probably cause many people 
climb on chairs and tables instead-a much riskier approach than using ex-
isting ladders. 
As for the "right to consumer education," the U.N. Guidelines show the 
same high-handed attitude toward educational systems as they do toward 
economic systems. Consumers in less developed countries may, in fact, 
need a great deal of education with regard to products and services-but 
they may need basic educational skills, such as literacy, much more. As an 
educator, I am naturally suspicious whenever outside interests attempt to 
dictate the contents of a curriculum. The results are usually ineffective utili-
zation of scarce educational resources. 
One general principle in the Guidelines raises very grave concerns: 
the right to economic safety from offenses or malpractices 
which deny consumers optimum benefit within their economic 
resources. 
Taken at face value, this is merely gibberish. But given the frequency with 
which people in Communist countries are thrown in jail for "economic of-
fenses" against the state, this provision is potentially very dangerous. Is 
"Big Brother" to determine what are "offenses and malpractices" and the 
point at which consumers have derived "optimum benefit" from resources? 
The one-sidedness of the Guidelines is indicated in the "right" of con-
sumer organizations "to be consulted and to have their views represented in 
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the decision-making process. "The Guidelines make absolutely no provision 
for representing the views of the very businesses that are regulated. In fact, 
this U.N. document is not written from the viewpoint of free-market socie-
ties: it speaks of "the decision-making process," as though only one can 
exist. That is the give-away. These Guidelines are designed for a central-
ized, planned economy in which the national government makes the key 
economic decisions. 
Here is another provisions worthy of our attention: 
Government policies should seek to ensure that consumers ob-
tain the maximum benefit from their economic resources. 
Does not this describe the United Nations as a global "nanny"? If I want 
to buy something silly for my wife's birthday, I could wind up violating a 
U.N. policy. 
Here's another: 
Producers should ensure the availability of reliable after-sales 
service. 
This Guideline probably violates the antitrust laws. Why presume that 
service must be provided by the producer, unless a sale is a non-
competitive, tie-in sale? Production and service are not necessarily pro-
vided best by the same source-at least this is true in competitive, open 
If I want to buy something silly for my wife's birthday, 
I could wind up violating a U.N. policy 
markets. Moreover, is this properly a concern of the United Nations? In 
the United States, we do not consider this an area for government regula-
tion at all. 
Another Guideline in the category of ''protection of economic in-
terests" casts the shadow of "Big Brother." One is the following: 
Governments should intensify their efforts to prevent 
economic offenses through systematically monitoring the 
adherence to the established laws and standards by producers, 
distributors and others involved in the provision of goods and 
services. 
It goes on to state that consumer groups "should be encouraged and 
supported in monitoring economic offenses. " What sort of government 
systematically monitors the actions of private citizens? What sort of 
government encourages and supports specific private groups in the 
monitoring of other private groups, as though they were licensed 
vigilantes? It is obvious that the authors of the Guidelines have little in-
terest in either economic freedom or personal liberty. 
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Finally, we see once again how the marketplace gets superseded in a 
section concerning food: 
Business practices affecting the processing and distribution of 
food products and especially the marketing of highly refined 
and expensive food products should be regulated in order to 
ensure that such practices do not conflict with consumers' in-
terests or government aims in the area of food policy. 
Who is going to judge the so-called "conflict" between consumers' in-
terests and business practices regarding the processing, distribution and 
marketing of food products? In free societies with market economies, if 
there is a "conflict," consumers protect their interests by not buying the 
product. Resorting to regulation simply projects "government aims" in 
food policy-and that is probably the true purpose of this provision. 
Moreover, why are "highly refined and expensive food products" singled 
out here? What all-wise power in a nation is going to determine that a 
specific category of food products presents a "conflict" with the interests 
of consumers, whereas another category does not? 
International regulation of the production and distribution of goods 
and services via these Guidelines is a far cry from the central role of the 
United Nations, which is, according to the U.N. charter, "to maintain 
international peace and security." It is sad to see the U.N. diverting its 
attention to large-scale forms of economic regulation when it is doing 
such an inadequate job of carrying out the basic task for which it was 
established. Moreover, its charter explicitly prohibits the United Nations 
from intervening ''in matters which are essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state." Much of the Consumer Protection Guidelines 
involves just such intervention. 
In short, the proposed U.N. Guidelines on Consumer Protection would 
impose centralized control on the economies of sovereign nations. The 
United Nations should focus instead on its fundamental role of peace-
keeper and not assume the role of global nanny. 
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Ill. Regulation of Business 
The Future of Regulatory Reform 
Actions on the regulatory reform front since January 1981 have 
simultaneously failed to meet the high hopes of regulatory reform en-
thusiasts and the fears of the defenders of the existing body of federal 
regulation. Those of us who are enthusiasts for regulatory reform must 
look back with disappointment at the modest changes, especially those 
regarding statutes, that have been made since January, 1981. It is 
fashionable, of course, to bemoan the lack of leadership on this score in 
either the Executive or Legislative Branches. Although I am not inclined 
to let either end of Pennsylvania Avenue off the hook, the basic problem 
is much deeper. It is the fact that the necessary foundation has not been 
laid in terms of public understanding and support for reducing the 
burdens of regulation. 
To be sure, the media are generally unhelpful, or at least extremely 
naive on that score. Just try to change a comma in the Clean Air Act, 
and you lay yourself open to charges that you want to "gut" environ-
mental protection, that you are a green-eyeshade type who does not care 
about ecology. Perhaps some modern-day Shakespeare can write the 
script whereby a reform-minded economist convincingly declares, "If I 
am polluted, do I not cough?" 
The sad fact is that public opinion polls show uncritical-and grow-
ing-support for the position of "environment tiber alles." For example, 
an April 1983 poll reported that 58 percent agreed with the following 
statement: "Protecting the environment is so important that requirements 
and standards cannot be too high and continuing environmental im-
provements must be made regardless of cost." 
It is also useful to observe the results of a survey examining who peo-
ple trust to recommend regulatory changes. In the case of the Clean Air 
Act, "environmental groups" received a positive 74 percent and univer-
sity professors 72 percent. "Business and industry" was last, with 39 per-
cent, just below the "news media" with 47 percent. Perhaps those of us 
in academia have been a bit too shy and have left the field of battle to 
the ''true believers.'' 
Today's regulatory system is far from the idyllic state in which it will 
consist solely of rulings that generate more benefits than costs-but 
neither is it about to wither away. The similarities between the regulatory 
system of mid-1983 and that of January 1981 are far greater than the dif-
ferences. Yet, when we listen to the spokesmen of the counterattack 
against regulatory reform, we hear a different viewpoint. Let the oppon-
ents of regulatory reform speak for themselves so we can judge the pro-
portions of analysis and emotion. Here is an excerpt of a recent article 
by Michael Pertschuk, former chairman and now member of the Federal 
Trade Commission: 
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A goodly number of Mr. Reagan's regulators have now spent 
two years dismantling the very regulations that in prior incar-
nations as corporate lawyers and lobbyists they had op-
posed ... Their deregulatory plans are fueled by an admixture 
of free-market ideology and corporate sycophancy. Con-
sumers are merely bugs on the windshield. 
Because Mr. Pertschuk and so many of his allies are attorneys, I am 
reminded of the old legal maxim: "if the law is against you, argue the 
The similarities between the regulatory system of 
mid-1983 and that of January 1981 are far greater 
than the differences 
facts; if the facts are against you, argue the law; if they are both against 
you, bang on the table." 
This surely is not the time to rest on laurels. Only a fraction of the 
regulatory reforms envisioned in the beginning of 1981 have been ac-
complished. Most of the progress has been made in the form of ad-
ministrative changes, especially those establishing a comprehensive system 
for reviewing pending rulemaking. 
William Ruckelshaus, the new administrator of the Environmental 
Protection Agency, has sounded a cautionary note. He contends that the 
current climate in Congress is not appropriate for considering changes in 
environmental legislation. Ruckelshaus' statement, as well as recent 
events at EPA, underscore the vital role of selecting appointees to 
regulatory agencies. The experiences of recent years in several administra-
tions demonstrate the need to select people who take a balanced ap-
proach to the benefits and burdens of regulation. Appointing uncritical 
enthusiasts for expansion of government regulation inevitably produces a 
regulatory regime characterized by excessive burdens and cavalier 
disregard for economic impacts. Similarly, regulators who lack a basic 
sympathy toward the programs they administer are counterproductive. 
They can set back the prospects for regulatory reform very substantially. 
Regulatory activities deemed worthy of continuation should be 
managed by people who are both sympathetic to the important social ob-
jectives to be achieved and equally concerned with minimizing the 
burdens. The leadership of regulatory agencies must understand that 
good policymaking means a careful balancing of a variety of important 
considerations-such as clean air and high employment, healthier work-
ing conditions and greater productivity. 
Under the circumstances, it is sad to read of the boasting of a group 
of ex-regulators in the Carter Administration that they will use networks 
of civil servants at their former agencies to oppose the Reagan Ad-
ministration's regulatory relief efforts. "These people will tip off the 
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former administrators," says the self-styled Regulatory Audit Group. 
"Yes, ... The network exists," states group member Joan Claybrook. 
Managing a regulatory agency under such circumstances approaching 
guerilla warfare is quite a challenge. Public understanding is helpful, and 
a stronger statutory foundation for more balanced regulation becomes 
essential. 
Perhaps the most urgent need is to convince members of Congress to 
demonstrate a sense of balance when they write the basic regulatory laws. 
The task of updating regulatory statutes is not easy. The types of 
changes that should be made depend on the nature of existing regulation, 
the specific regulatory mechanisms currently in use, and the short-
comings, if any, in the unregulated private economy. A simple or 
uniform response is not appropriate. Each regulatory law should be ex-
amined individually and carefully, and-despite the counterattacks by the 
advocates of further government intervention-dispassionately. 
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Expropriation Rears Its Ugly Head 
The stability and fairness of our political institutions are a unique 
hallmark of the United States. In fact, one of the basic arguments we 
often employ to attract investment from overseas is the knowledge that 
the threat of expropriation does not face private enterprises in the United 
States the way it does in many nations overseas. 
Unfortunately, such is not always the case. For example, local govern-
ment in Oregon is attempting what is literally a power grab. Using an 
obscure law (the Federal Water Power Act of 1930), public utility 
districts in that state are trying to take over a private dam used for the 
production of electricity via hydropower. The Merwin Dam was built by 
the Pacific Power and Light Company more than half a century ago. 
That investor-owned utility has been operating and maintaining it ever 
since. 
Government-owned utilities in many parts of the Pacific Northwest 
have gained a dominant position. Now they are trying to use the pro-
cedures of federal energy regulation to require the sale of the Merwin 
Dam to them at bargain basement or, more accurately, forced sale 
prices. 
Back in the early 1930s, the Pacific Power and Light Company spent 
$20 million to build the dam. Given the tremendous amount of inflation 
since then, the current value is in the neighborhood of ten times that 
amount. But earlier this year, an administrative law judge of the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission ruled against the company. He is urging 
the Commission to force Pacific Power and Light to sell the dam and its 
135,000-kilowatt capacity generators to public power agencies for $10 
million-which is the depreciated book value. 
Using the book (historical basis) depreciated value instead of the cur-
rent market value is a facade for confiscation. That arbitrary action has 
all the earmarks of the foreign takeovers of American business that we 
so properly decry. The company is appealing the ruling to the full 
membership of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. 
Because Merwin Dam provides only 4 percent of Pacific Power and 
Light's power supplies, this episode might be described as the proverbial 
tempest in a teapot. But there are many other privately built and 
operated hydropower facilities in the Pacific Northwest that could come 
under a similar attack should the current government position prevail. 
We forget that many small private utilities in recent years have been 
taken over by government-owned utilities because of the array of federal 
statutes which discriminate against private enterprise. 
For example, when the Environmental Protection Agency established 
sewage standards several years ago, that forced privately owned sewer 
companies to sell out to government agencies. That action occurred 
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because, under the federal statute, EPA could give the government-
owned agency a generous grant to cover the cost of meeting its stan-
dards, but it could not give tax-paying business enterprises a nickle. 
We delude ourselves if we believe that government-owned utilities are a 
bargain. The prices they charge may be lower, but much of their costs 
are passed on to the taxpayer and consumer in other forms. Because they 
are exempt from taxes, the rest of us have to pay more-or see those 
budget deficits rise even further. Because the interest on their bonds is 
Public takeovers of private enterprise beget 
more government intervention 
tax-exempt-and hence their securities have especially attractive after-tax 
yields-private companies have to pay higher interest rates in order to 
sell their bonds. 
Public takeovers of private enterprise beget more government interven-
tion. The less efficient the government undertakings, the higher the 
government has to raise taxes in order to subsidize them. The heavier the 
tax burden on private businesses, the fewer funds they have available to 
finance expansion. The result is increased pressure for bigger 
government. 
The moral of the tale is clear. We must constantly guard against those 
well-meaning proposals that fail to take account of the full costs they im-
pose on the private enterprise system and, thus, on the American 
consumer. 
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Five Ways to Improve U.S. Energy Policy 
Over the years, an inconsistent blend of regulatory and tax policies has 
made it more difficult and costly to achieve the nation's energy objec-
tives. There are fundamental problems of consistency in relating the 
long-term goal of increasing domestic energy supplies and the workings 
of regulatory and tax policies. 
For example, for many years depletion allowances encouraged 
domestic production while "prorationing" restricted the actual amounts 
that could be produced. Price controls on natural gas encouraged con-
sumption of energy, while import restrictions curtailed the supply of 
energy. Yet, earlier periods of American history showed that-without 
either government subsidy or controls-the private sector could and did 
readily adjust to changes in the availabilty of and demand for energy. 
When we examine the pre-regulatory period, we find that successive 
shifts occurred from one energy source to another, as the underlying 
economics-relative prices-changed. The changes were comparatively 
quick and easy. In 1800, for example, illumination was provided mainly 
by candles and oil lamps, with fuel for the lamps coming from whale oil. 
Yet, whales did not become extinct as the country grew. As the price of 
whale oil rose, consumers simply switched to substitutes. In the 1850s, 
coal oil or kerosene dominated the residential market for illumination. 
Its success was followed by an equally meteoric decline in favor of a new 
fuel that had appeared in the market, petroleum. 
The shifts from whale oil to kerosene to gasoline resulted not from an 
act of Congress or a subsidy from the Treasury, but from successive 
movements in the price of energy. The implication is clear: the sooner 
that government frees all energy sources, such as natural gas, from ar-
tificial price restraints, the sooner will new domestic energy sources 
become commercially competitive. Conversely, the continuation of price 
controls on natural gas delays the time when new domestic sources, in-
cluding solar energy or synthetic fuels, will come into widespread use. 
The major spur to developing domestic energy sources is not government 
subsidy, but price decontrol of existing energy sources. 
The clash between economic efficiency and government regulation is 
currently most visible in the area of natural gas. The Natural Gas Policy 
Act of 1978 was designed to raise the wellhead prices of natural gas in 
order to help achieve a balance between supply and demand. But the 
numerous price disparities among different categories of gas prompted 
new inefficiencies. The smooth transition to a deregulated market envi-
sioned by the framers of the Act will not occur under the existing statute. 
High-priced natural gas is being imported from Canada at a time when 
cheaper U.S. supplies are in surplus. The problems in the gas market 
have been caused by the interaction of inflexible federal price control and 
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rigid contracts between pipeline companies and producers. The contracts, 
in turn, were by-products of the long and convoluted history of govern-
ment regulation of energy. 
The basic problem is that federal regulation is too rigid to allow gas 
prices to reflect changing conditions. Natural gas prices are now at levels 
that have encouraged switching back to oil. With an estimated 15 percent 
of capacity idle, it is not clear that a sharp run up in prices would result 
if natural gas were deregulated. The successful decontrol of oil prices in 
1981 provides the appropriate model. 
The Future Role of Regulatory Policy 
There is another way in which regulation hinders domestic energy pro-
duction. Environmental and other regulations create major obstacles fac-
ing virtually every proposed energy project-including those that are 
finally approved. One of the most serious energy problems in the United 
States today is the long delays that occur during the planning and con-
struction phases of new energy projects-even those that successfully sur-
mount all of the regulatory obstacles. From the investor's viewpoint, 
those problems increase uncertainty-which can be devastating for major 
capital projects such as those involved in developing new forms of 
energy. Let us recall that it took a special act of Congress to override 
legal and ecological barriers so that the Alaskan pipeline could proceed. 
A realistic and effective government policy for the 
energy sector of the economy requires changes in the 
federal tax and regulatory systems 
Nevertheless, public concern about pollution of air and water and 
destruction of natural resources continues to be great. The need, thus, is 
for a careful review of the vast and cumbersome regulatory labyrinth. 
The purpose should be to achieve a more cost-effective regulatory regime 
by eliminating or revising the numerous regulations that do not pass the 
economic test of generating more benefits than costs. 
Recommendations 
From the viewpoint of better meeting the needs of American con-
sumers, a realistic and effective government policy for the energy sector 
of the economy requires changes in the federal tax and regulatory 
systems. These changes fall into two categories: (1) eliminating the 
special benefits that have been granted to the various segments of the 
energy industry, and (2) simultaneously removing the many obstacles that 
have been placed in the industry's path. Here is a brief outline of the 
needed changes: 
(1) Eliminate the windfall profits tax. That tax does nothing to help 
49 
curtail energy consumption, but it simultaneously reduces the financial 
ability of the private sector to increase domestic energy production. 
(2) Eliminate the regulatory functions of the Department of Energy. 
The sooner that domestic energy prices equal world market prices, the 
sooner will new domestic energy sources-conventional and unconven-
tional, including synthetic fuel, solar energy, geothermal etc.-become 
competitive. Moreover, realistic prices are the most effective stimulus to 
energy conservation. Deregulation of natural gas prices is long overdue. 
(3) Eliminate the host of tax breaks for specialized energy projects. 
Tax subsidies would no longer be needed in an environment where 
realistic energy prices prevail. The experience of the home insulation in-
dustry is instructive. The producers in that industry found that their 
order books became full when the public realized that insulation is a 
good way of reducing high and rising energy costs. The federal subsidies 
actually came later. 
(4) Cut back the regulatory obstacles which impede the construction 
and operation of new energy projects. What is truly needed is a com-
prehensive reform of the regulatory process. Without these reforms, 
many of the tax incentives for new investment will be ineffective. The in-
ability to obtain the many government permits needed for a new project 
cannot be overcome by increasing the after-tax rate of return. 
(5) Cut back the expenditure subsidies for the highly specific energy ac-
tivities that the Congress arbitrarily has chosen to support. These special 
aids would no longer be necessary if the first four proposals are adopted. 
The elimination of the windfall profits tax revenues would make it more 
urgent to reduce these low-priority outlays in order to minimize budget 
deficits. 
Boiled down to its essence, the most effective regulatory policy to pro-
mote domestic energy development and production is to achieve a well-
functioning market economy that does not require special policies for 
any specific industry-energy or any other. In an analogous manner, the 
optimum tax policy is to treat the activities of the energy industry exactly 
the same way as any other business-without prejudice or favoritism. 
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IV. Economic Change in the 1980s 
In Change There Is Opportunity 
"Forth into the future's dawning glow" is what the poet tells us. The 
economist, in contrast, traditionally is the wet blanket. Realistically, the 
future is not likely to be glowing. But there will be a future in which 
each industry, company, and individual will have an opportunity to suc-
ceed or to fail. 
What kind of future does American business face in the coming 
decade? The shortest response on record would be simply to say, "We 
don't know." But this professor does not use short answer tests, even for 
himself. Like many students trying to answer a difficult essay question, 
let us reconnoiter around the question before we respond. To begin with, 
life is full of surprises. Looking back over the past three decades, who 
had any idea that we would see the United States in two major wars, or 
that inflation and unemployment would ever again reach double digits, 
or that hard rock would become something you listen to rather than try 
to pulverize? On the latter score, sometimes I am tempted to revert. 
Traditionally, we have associated growth with opportunity. A rapidly 
expanding national economy, almost by definition, generates a great 
array of new markets, new products, and new jobs. That surely was true 
for much of the past. But, more recently, when the growth rate of the 
economy dropped, the expectations of most of us declined. The outlook 
of many turned sour because, supposedly, opportunity was also 
declining. 
But perhaps the economist does not have to be totally the wet blanket 
after all. Even in a bad year, our private enterprise system generates far 
more jobs and income per capita than other economic systems do in their 
best years. After all, the acid test of the strength, durability, and attrac-
tiveness of a private enterprise economy occurs when the borders between 
a capitalist and a communist nation are opened. We can predict with un-
failing accuracy the direction in which people will voluntarily move. 
Whatever their limitations, capitalistic societies win overwhelmingly when 
people vote with their feet. 
But there are more specific reasons for sounding an upbeat note. We 
have learned that change also brings opportunity. And the continued ad-
vances in technology surely indicate that the pace of change will not 
slacken. There is a renewal in our society of faith in science and tech-
nology. The 1980s will see the introduction of more changes resulting 
from new technology than the 1970s-changes in basic office and factory 
work procedures and further shifts from standard products to more 
sophisticated items such as word processors and robots, which are 
hybrids of goods and services. 
To succeed in times of change, rather than in periods of rapid growth, 
is more of a challenge. Not every industry, and surely not every company 
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or individual, necessarily comes out a winner. But it is a far more 
dynamic situation than the broad set of numbers show at first blush. 
After all, in every year-good, bad, or indifferent-someone is starting a 
company or launching a product or hatching an idea that will grow and 
To succeed in times of change, rather than in periods 
of rapid growth, is more of a challenge 
prosper. At the time, we are not able to forecast the specific winners or 
losers. But with the benefit of hindsight, we know that there will be some 
of each. Similarly, we are not a static society. The boom towns of the 
1960s and 1970s were in different locations than the likely growth areas 
of the 1980s. But the same may undoubtedly be true for the places that 
declined in the '60s and '70s, as well as those that will fizzle in the '80s. 
Let us focus on four types of changes that will vitally affect business 
opportunities in the decade of the 1980s and beyond. We need to 
acknowledge that many of those who respond to the changes may indeed 
see them as opportunities. Yet, others, especially those who merely react 
passively, will find them more in the nature of threats. 
Economic and Social Changes 
First of all, we are already seeing a shift in emphasis from traditional 
smokestack industries to service and manufacturing companies whose 
products have a much higher content of knowledge, information, and 
technical skill. But it is important to keep that change in perspective. 
Clearly, there is genuine reason for concern about the future in regions 
of high unemployment and declining sales. But U.S. manufacturing com-
panies are not about to collapse. Indeed, those firms that succeed in 
enhancing their productivity and controlling their costs will prosper. 
Let us turn to the second important shift, which is geographic. Increas-
ingly, people are finding that the quality of life often diminishes in the 
largest metropolitan areas, and that small towns still lack the amenities 
and diversity of activity that many people have come to expect. Medium-
size cities now have the most favorable growth prospects for the years 
ahead. That is where many people want to live, and where companies are 
setting up new factories, branch stores, and regional offices. The in-
dustrial growth is occurring in cities large enough to provide a good 
range of amenities to their citizens, but small enough so that the in-
dividual does not feel overwhelmed. 
This geographic shift is also taking place in good measure because of a 
related but undramatic, long-term trend occurring in the American 
economy. It is the adjustment to a lower level of inflation. This is a 
positive-but not a painless-process. Costs are often lower in the 
medium-sized cities. There is also a new sense of realism in business deci-
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sion making today. Companies are becoming more cost-conscious. 
Poorly justified company investments and lax expense commitments are 
no longer automatically bailed out by inflation. Managements are learn-
ing once again the advantages of being competitive in an economy in 
which the federal government does not automatically come to help out 
every loser in the marketplace. 
Similarly, employees are learning that their wages, salaries and fringe 
benefits are vitally dependent on the future success of their company. 
Workers are increasingly-though perhaps not enthusiastically-willing 
to accept changes in contracts, workrules, and job practices necessary to 
ensure their company's future. Consumers are learning the hard way that 
purchases of art and coins and postage stamps are once again judged as 
consumption activities, rather than easy investments in what had been a 
continually rising price level. 
But this new sense of realism is very recent. It could easily be reversed 
if the federal government decides to bail out various declining industries. 
A third important shift in the years ahead is the renewed emphasis on 
the private sector of the economy. People are once again advocating a 
reduced role for government as an agent of social change. Not that the 
state will wither away. But, certainly for the next several years, we can 
expect that the private sector will be growing faster than the public sec-
tor. In part, that is a reaction to the rapid expansion in government ac-
tivities that we have witnessed in recent decades-an expansion that often 
has created more problems than it has cured. That shift reflects the 
rediscovery that the private enterprise system, despite its various short-
comings, is still the primary engine of progress in our society and the key 
generator of income and wealth. 
The fourth and final shift is a growth in our communal perspective, 
from essentially domestic-national concerns to worldwide-multinational 
dimensions. Surely, we cannot anticipate any movement to world govern-
ment. That would run counter to the prevailing trend of decentralization 
We are increasingly abandoning the notion that if anything 
goes wrong in an individual's life experience, the blame 
should be borne by society as a whole 
of governmental power in modern societies. What comes to mind are 
such obvious but undramatic changes as the doubling in the proportion 
of our national production that is exported-as well as a doubling in the 
proportion of our national income that is spent on imports. 
Then, of course, we have experienced quite a few dramatic instances of 
the powerful impact of foreign developments on our domestic society. 
Two related cases are the OPEC oil embargo in 1973-74 and the Iranian 
Revolution in 1979, both of which had immediate and costly impacts on 
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our economy as well as on our personal lifestyles. 
In addition, many industries are feeling the effects of foreign competi-
tion. The traditional response too often is to complain to the government 
and ask it to restrict imports. The more satisfactory approach, of course 
is to examine ourselves and see how we can do better. After all, we can-' 
not blame our poor production practices-on for({gners. A very con-
siderable pace of change can be expected in the years ahead, as well as 
no shortage of problems in our society. The changes surely will provide 
growing opportunities for those who try to take advantage of them. 
Opportunity, Risk-and Work 
Along with the opportunity that change brings, however, there is also 
greater uncertainty. With greater opportunity there goes, of course, more 
risk. And that, too, is another area of change that is becoming visible. 
As a nation, we are increasingly abandoning the notion that, if anything 
goes wrong in an individual's life experience, the blame should be borne 
by "them," by society as a whole. We are coming to realize that if it is 
our skills and efforts that should be rewarded when things go well-then 
that also implies the reverse. It is our individual responsibility when 
things do not work out as well as we expected them to. Thus, greater op-
portunity also implies more individual responsibility. 
Finally, it has been my observation over many years that one factor is 
often the determining variable. It is the original four-letter word-
WORK. The degree of sustained industriousness, the ability to work hard 
even in the face of unexpected disappointments, is often the most impor-
tant long-run factor influencing who will succeed greatly or who will just 
make it-or who will fail. 
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The Economic Challenges of the 1980s 
The odds favor a future period of sustained economic growth, accom-
panied by moderate inflation. But this happy turn of events is not writ-
ten in the stars. Surely, the political process is not going to keep 
economic policy on automatic pilot for any length of time. Moreover, in-
flation may well accelerate again and the nation's growth rate may sput-
ter. Yet a healthier economy will be more likely if, as a nation, we make 
three types of difficult decisions: 
1. Labor and management in each industry must deal with the com-
petitive problems that face them, rather than seek government assistance. 
Although discussions of economic policy inevitably are drawn to public-
sector actions, we need to be reminded that ours is a private enterprise 
system in which most economic decisions are made in the private sector. 
After all, so many of the difficuliies facing our key smokestack in-
dustries are due to decisions by the companies and the unions in those in-
dustries. Management and unions together have pushed their labor costs 
far beyond other American manufacturing industries, and, until recently, 
the industries have emphasized high unit profit but stagnant rather than 
growing market areas. Many industries have also been slow in adopting 
new technology. 
Moreover, it is intriguing to examine the few cases where management 
is about to close a low-or no-profit factory-and the employees purchase 
it. Then the new owners proceed to make the difficult decisions-to slim 
down manager and worker ranks, eliminate unproductive work practices, 
and so forth. Ironically, if labor and management had agreed to that 
course of action earlier, in many cases the factory would not have been 
closed down in the first place. 
The easy answer to today's difficulties-which often unites manage-
ment and labor-is to go to Washington for credit or import restraints or 
other subsidies. This special treatment, of course, comes at the expense 
of consumers and taxpayers. It should be opposed primarily because it 
provides the wrong signals for future economic behavior. 
2. Government decision makers must face up to the fact that the 1981 
tax cuts have not been matched by expenditure reductions. In a real 
sense, those tax cuts have not yet been earned. They can be earned, 
however, by reducing the rapid growth of federal outlays. Three major 
areas of the budget are promising candidates for further pruning. We all 
know about entitlements and defense. But it does not require exhaustive 
research to reveal a third part of the budget: "all other." Not all the 
items in that part of the budget are social programs, nor have they been 
cut to the bone. Generously funded programs such as subsidies to dairy, 
tobacco, and sugar producers and to ship builders and ship operators are 
good-or bad-examples. These and many other special benefits to 
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specific segments of society are in the budget simply because of the 
political muscle of the special-interest groups supporting them. 
Given the outlook for substantial deficit spending, more of those 
sacred cows in the federal budget should be taken out of the feedlot and 
led to slaughter. Our economic prospects would be a lot brighter if the 
deficits were half their current size. The sensible solution is not to raise 
taxes. Rather, it is to cut spending comprehensively in each of the three 
categories. 
3. Finally, to face the real economic problems in our country today, 
we must focus more on our own shortcomings rather than take the easy, 
and low, road of blaming our economic difficulties on "foreign devils." 
We should begin by acknowledging the obstacles that we have put in the 
way of our own exports. Our "holier than thou" attitude toward protec-
tionism offends our trading partners who are well aware of our many 
obstacles to their exports-as well as our wounds that have been self-
inflicted through federal restrictions on our own exports (often for 
foreign policy purposes). At a time when reciprocity has become a new 
buzzword in foreign trade policy, perhaps we can reduce some of the 
barriers to our own exports and then ''reciprocate'' by reducing some of 
our import barriers. 
Conclusion 
My final point is to stress the importance of time as a key variable in 
economic decision making. For example, the panaceas tend to be popular 
because the benefits come early and the costs later. An easy money 
policy is a good example. Conversely, the tough but effective ap-
proaches, such as monetary restraint to curb escalating inflation, 
generate their costs before their benefits. 
An important characteristic of good management 
is to make tough decisions promptly 
Yet, those hard choices become even more difficult the longer we wait. 
The longer that the tough decisions are postponed, the more imbedded 
"entitlements" arise in the workplace, and the greater nm;nber of trade 
obstacles are in place, and so on. And time can be crucial in a budget 
restraint effort. After all, the most uneconomical project may begin to 
develop a serious economic justification after substantial outlays are 
made on it. The argument for completing it becomes compelling: What is 
the value of half a bridge, or half a breeder reactor, or half a nuclear 
carrier? 
Thus, an important characteristic of good management, whether in the 
private or the public sector, is to make tough decisions promptly. Most 
people can make those decisions in a time of crisis. The challenge is to 
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act so as to avoid the need to press the panic button. 
Let me conclude with this note. Please remember during the difficult 
periods ahead that, of all the bumper stickers and marching slogans one 
might use, the most appropriate sign is the one that proclaims, "The end 
of the world has been postponed." 
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